The Effects of Voter Partisanship on Economic Redistribution: Evidence from Gerrymandering

66 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2019 Last revised: 2 Nov 2021

See all articles by Sahil Raina

Sahil Raina

University of Alberta - School of Business

Sheng-Jun Xu

University of Alberta - School of Business

Date Written: June 7, 2021

Abstract

We study how voter partisanship affects economic redistribution. We model that partisan alignment between voters and their legislative representative reduces the representative's incentive to serve her constituents' economic interests. To identify shifts in partisan alignment, we exploit U.S. congressional redistricting and show that partisan gerrymandering produces predictable shifts in district-level voter partisanship. Comparing districts where the gerrymandering party's candidate narrowly won and narrowly lost the pre-redistricting election, we find representatives insulated by favorable gerrymandering vote more frequently with their party on congressional bills and bring less discretionary federal spending to their districts relative to representatives exposed by unfavorable gerrymandering.

Keywords: political economy, distributive politics, gerrymandering, redistricting, partisanship

JEL Classification: D72, H73, P16

Suggested Citation

Raina, Sahil and Xu, Sheng-Jun, The Effects of Voter Partisanship on Economic Redistribution: Evidence from Gerrymandering (June 7, 2021). Proceedings of Paris December 2019 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2019-505, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3396699

Sahil Raina

University of Alberta - School of Business ( email )

2-32B Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://sites.ualberta.ca/~sraina/

Sheng-Jun Xu (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - School of Business ( email )

2-32D Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada

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