Industry Tournament Incentives and Corporate Hedging Policies

71 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2019 Last revised: 21 Apr 2020

See all articles by Gunratan Lonare

Gunratan Lonare

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte

Ahmet Nart

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte

Ahmet M. Tuncez

University of Michigan at Dearborn - College of Business

Date Written: April 21, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines how a tournament among CEOs to progress within the CEO labor market changes their tendency toward corporate hedging policies. We exploit the textual analysis of 10-Ks to generate corporate hedging proxies. We find that the likelihood and intensity to hedge increases as the CEO labor market tournament prizes augment. We explore the mitigating impacts of corporate hedging on the adverse effects of risk-inducing ITIs on the cost of debt and stock price crash risk, which could be the possible reasons for the relation. Also, the relation between ITIs and corporate hedging is less pronounced for firms that demonstrate more financial distress and when CEOs are the founders or of retirement age. We identify a causal relation between ITIs and corporate hedging by using an instrumental variable approach and an exogenous shock sourced by the changes in the enforceability of non-competition agreements across states.

Keywords: corporate hedging, risk management, tournament incentives, executive compensation, risk-taking, pay gap, FX hedging

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J31, J33

Suggested Citation

Lonare, Gunratan and Nart, Ahmet and Tuncez, Ahmet M., Industry Tournament Incentives and Corporate Hedging Policies (April 21, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3397444 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3397444

Gunratan Lonare (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte ( email )

Ahmet Nart

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte ( email )

Charlotte, NC
United States

Ahmet M. Tuncez

University of Michigan at Dearborn - College of Business ( email )

Fairlane Center South
19000 Hubbard Drive
Dearborn, MI 48126-2638
United States

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