Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

75 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2019

See all articles by Isaac Mbiti

Isaac Mbiti

University of Virginia; IZA

Mauricio Romero

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica

Youdi Schipper

Twaweza

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2019

Abstract

We use a field experiment in Tanzania to compare the effectiveness on learning of two teacher performance pay systems. The first is a Pay for Percentile system (a rank-order tournament). The second rewards teachers based on multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for Percentile can (under certain conditions) induce optimal effort among teachers, but our threshold system is easier to implement and provides teachers with clearer goals and targets. Both systems improved student test scores. However, the multiple-thresholds system was more effective in boosting student learning and is less costly.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Suggested Citation

Mbiti, Isaac and Romero, Mauricio and Schipper, Youdi, Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (May 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25903. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398073

Isaac Mbiti (Contact Author)

University of Virginia ( email )

1400 University Ave
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

IZA ( email )

Mauricio Romero

ITAM, Centro de Investigación Económica ( email )

Camino a Santa Teresa No. 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Ciudad de México
Mexico

Youdi Schipper

Twaweza ( email )

127 Mafinga Road
P.O. Box 38342
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
52
PlumX Metrics