Congress, Foreign Policy & Financial Reporting

54 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2019

See all articles by Chase Potter

Chase Potter

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Date Written: June 3, 2019

Abstract

I examine the economic consequences of expanding the scope of financial disclosure to include a foreign policy objective. I use the disclosure requirements of Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2012 (ITRA), which attempts to isolate Iran by forcing SEC issuers to disclose ties with Iranian-affiliated entities, as my empirical setting. I find ITRA disclosures impose penalties on firms who do business with Iran along several dimensions: (i) Iran revenue declines by 70 percent following implementation, (ii) disclosure generates negative abnormal returns and (iii) institutional ownership declines. I also document other unintended consequences of ITRA disclosures. First, I find that foreign issuers are more likely to delist from U.S. exchanges following ITRA disclosures and domestic issuers’ political action committees increase their campaign contributions. Second, I document a financial reporting distortion through a temporary pattern of depressed reported income but stable cash flows. Third, I find that disclosing firms’ annual filings have a more negative tone. Overall, the evidence suggests that adapting securities regulation to serve political objectives, while effective at achieving those objectives, also entails unintended consequences.

Keywords: Non-financial Disclosure; Real Effects; Iran Threat Reduction Act; Political Cost Hypothesis

Suggested Citation

Potter, Chase, Congress, Foreign Policy & Financial Reporting (June 3, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3398454

Chase Potter (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

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