From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?
65 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2019 Last revised: 13 Oct 2020
Date Written: September 30, 2020
Post-crisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from non-bank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business toward matchmaking. Thus, post-crisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.
Keywords: bank regulation, financial crisis, corporate bonds, liquidity, over-the-counter markets, broker-dealers, Basel 2.5, Basel III, Volcker Rule, post-crisis regulation, market making, matchmaking, market microstructure
JEL Classification: G01, G12, G21, G24, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation