Effects of Workplace Competition on Work Time and Gender Inequality

46 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2019 Last revised: 8 May 2023

See all articles by Amalia R. Miller

Amalia R. Miller

University of Virginia - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ragan Petrie

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research

Carmit Segal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 31, 2023

Abstract

High-pay, high-status jobs are competitive and male-dominated and demand long work hours. We study the role of competition in producing the latter two outcomes using two field experiments. Paying tournament prizes for performance induces both men and women to work longer, but men respond more to a high-prize tournament and are more likely to choose tournament-based compensation over a wage rate for large prizes. This demonstrates that high-stakes workplace competition can fuel gender inequality both directly, because men are more likely to enter and win tournaments, and indirectly, by raising work hours, which hurts women who face greater time demands in household production.

Keywords: tournaments, performance pay, long work hours, gender inequality

JEL Classification: M52, M55, J16, J22, J33, J44, D91

Suggested Citation

Miller, Amalia R. and Petrie, Ragan and Segal, Carmit, Effects of Workplace Competition on Work Time and Gender Inequality (March 31, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399128 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3399128

Amalia R. Miller (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.virginia.edu/~am5by/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Ragan Petrie

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics ( email )

4228 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

Level 5, FBE Building, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia

Carmit Segal

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Winterthurerstrasse 30
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/carmitsegal/

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