Playing for Constitutional Time: Interim Constitutions & Transitional Provisions
Ginsburg, Tom, and Eric Alston. "Playing for constitutional time: Interim constitutions and transitional provisions." The Timing of Lawmaking (2017): 110
Posted: 17 Jun 2019
Date Written: March 31, 2017
Because constitutions do not last forever, polities face the problem of transitions. In recent years, national constitution-making processes have tended to employ two mechanisms to effectuate the transition between the former regime and incoming one: (i) interim constitutions; and (ii) transitional provisions. In this chapter, we provide a descriptive and conceptual account of interim constitutions and transitional provisions in national constitutions. In our view interim constitutions should ideally outline the process by which a new constitution shall be drafted, be temporally delimited, and provide a framework that builds political trust among the different interest groups involved in the process. Transitional provisions, as part of the new constitution itself, should be temporary provisions that clearly outline the sequence and timing of the transition to the broad realization of the new constitutional order. Properly applied to short-term questions of legal transition and constitutional implementation, transition mechanisms can play a valuable role in constitutional processes.
Keywords: Interim Constitutions, Transition Provisions, Constitutional Transitions, Constitutional Design, Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Timing
JEL Classification: K39, K49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation