The Vanke-Baoneng Case and Beyond: Hostile Takeover and Corporate Governance in China

37 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2020 Last revised: 1 Sep 2020

See all articles by Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang

Peking University School of Transnational Law, ECGI (European Corporate Governance Institute), CFA, FRM

Date Written: April 17, 2018

Abstract

This draft explores the takeover war between Vanke (target) and Baoneng Group (bidder) and related issues on hostile takeovers in China. The Vanke-Baoneng case (hereinafter Vanke case) has raised many questions about corporate governance, a market for corporate control, market institutions, regulatory issues, and political economy implications. The draft consists of three Parts. Part I sketches the Vanke case. Part II examines some selective corporate governance topics relating to the Vanke case and the hostile takeover regime in China. Part III summarizes the draft and concludes.

Keywords: China, Vanke and Baoneng, Hostile Takeover, Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Kang, Sang Yop, The Vanke-Baoneng Case and Beyond: Hostile Takeover and Corporate Governance in China (April 17, 2018). Peking University School of Transnational Law Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399767 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3399767

Sang Yop Kang (Contact Author)

Peking University School of Transnational Law, ECGI (European Corporate Governance Institute), CFA, FRM ( email )

University Town, Nanshan District
Shenzhen, 518055
China

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