Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy

49 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2019 Last revised: 17 Dec 2019

See all articles by Joshua D. Wright

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics

Aurelien Portuese

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation; George Mason University

Date Written: May 20, 2019

Abstract

Antitrust populism – or the populist use of competition policies – is currently on the rise again. This is mainly due to the challenges brought about by the digital economy to traditional competition tools. From a normative perspective, the economics of competition law should avoid embarking into the outdated populist reasoning of the early days of antitrust policy. From a positive perspective, there is a need to conceptualise such modern antitrust populism because its rampant influence requires further scrutiny. This is the main objective of that Article: it offers a taxonomy of antitrust populism, distinguishing between conceptual antitrust populism and political antitrust populism. It is argued in this Article that both facets of antitrust populism bolster and reinvigorate one another. This taxonomy of antitrust populism enables us to better understand (and subsequently tackle) the unprincipled use of antitrust laws for populist reasons. After having introduced the concept of antitrust populism (I), we shall decipher what we call political antitrust populism (II) before delving into the intellectual roots of conceptual antitrust populism (III). We shall conclude upon the implications of the taxonomy of antitrust populism henceforth proposed (IV).

Keywords: antitrust; populism; digital; competition

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D. and Portuese, Aurélien, Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy (May 20, 2019). Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3400274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400274

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Mclean, VA 22101
United States

Aurélien Portuese (Contact Author)

Information Technology and Innovation Foundation ( email )

1101 K Street N.W.
Suite 610
Washington, DC 20005
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://itif.org/issues/regulation-and-antitrust

George Mason University ( email )

United States

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