Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement

44 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2019

See all articles by Francesco Decarolis

Francesco Decarolis

Boston University; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Gaétan de Rassenfosse

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Leonardo M. Giuffrida

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Emilio Raiteri

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

What is the impact of buyers on the performance of innovation procurement? In which phase of the procurement process are buyers most crucial and why? We address these questions by exploiting a novel dataset that links U.S. federal R&D contracts to their follow-on patents, citations and claims. Using the deaths of managers in the offices close to where contracts are performed as shocks to the functioning of these offices, we measure a positive and sizable effect of public buyers on all three outcome measures. The buyer's role is stronger in the pre-award, tender-design phase, where cooperation between different specialists is essential, than in the following contract-management phase typically performed by individual officers. Consistently, bureaus where employees perceive high level of cooperation within the office are associated with better R&D outcomes.

Keywords: Buyers, Innovation, Management Practices, patents, Procurement, R&D Procurement

JEL Classification: H11, H57, O31, O32, O38

Suggested Citation

Decarolis, Francesco and de Rassenfosse, Gaétan and Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria and Iossa, Elisabetta and Mollisi, Vincenzo and Raiteri, Emilio and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement (June 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13777. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401864

Francesco Decarolis

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.bu.edu/fdc/

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Gaétan De Rassenfosse (Contact Author)

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Station 5
Odyssea 1.04
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

Leonardo Maria Giuffrida

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

L 7, 1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, 00133
Italy

IEFE Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

Emilio Raiteri

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( email )

Station 5
Odyssea 1.04
1015 Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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