Diversity and Conflict

96 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2019

See all articles by Cemal Eren Arbatli

Cemal Eren Arbatli

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Quamrul H. Ashraf

Williams College - Department of Economics

Oded Galor

Brown University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Marc Klemp

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

This research advances the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal population diversity has contributed significantly to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity across nations and ethnic groups, it demonstrates that population diversity, as determined predominantly during the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, has contributed significantly to the risk and intensity of historical and contemporary civil conflicts. The findings arguably reflect the adverse effect of population diversity on interpersonal trust, its contribution to divergence in preferences for public goods and redistributive policies, and its impact on the degree of fractionalization and polarization across ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.

Keywords: ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, interpersonal trust, Political Preferences, population diversity, Social conflict

JEL Classification: D74, N30, N40, O11, O43, Z13

Suggested Citation

Arbatli, Cemal Eren and Ashraf, Quamrul H. and Galor, Oded and Klemp, Marc, Diversity and Conflict (June 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13779. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401866

Cemal Eren Arbatli (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

26 Shabolovka Street
1215
Moscow, 119049
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/erenarbatli/home

Quamrul H. Ashraf

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

24 Hopkins Hall Drive
Williamstown, MA 01267
United States
(413) 597-2476 (Phone)
(413) 597-4045 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.williams.edu/profile/qha1/

Oded Galor

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Providence, RI 02912
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Oded_Galor/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Oded_Galor/

Marc Klemp

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

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