The Japanese Judiciary

Forthcoming, Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, Robert Pekkanen & Saadia Pekkanen, eds., New York: Oxford University Press

Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 1007

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 19-47

16 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2019

Date Written: June 12, 2019

Abstract

In this essay for the Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, I survey the state of (and the research into) the Japanese judiciary. Japan operates a largely honest and meritocratic judiciary. The court's administrative office (and indirectly, the ruling party) can reward and punish judge for the quality of the work they do -- and has. For the most part, the administrative office uses that capacity to reward good work. It can also use the capacity to punish opposition politics -- but self-selection into the judiciary seems to keep the (perceived) need for that political intervention to a minimum.

Keywords: courts, judicial independence

JEL Classification: K1, K40

Suggested Citation

Ramseyer, J. Mark, The Japanese Judiciary (June 12, 2019). Forthcoming, Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, Robert Pekkanen & Saadia Pekkanen, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 1007 , Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 19-47, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402108

J. Mark Ramseyer (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4878 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)

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