Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More? The Role of On-the-Job Training

33 Pages Posted: 21 Oct 2002

See all articles by Holger Görg

Holger Görg

University of Kiel; Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Eric Strobl

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Frank Walsh

National University of Ireland - University College Dublin

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

Foreign-owned firms have consistently been found to pay higher wages than domestic firms to what appear to be equally productive workers in both developed and developing countries alike. Although a number of studies have documented and some attempted to explain this stylized fact, the issue still remains unresolved. In a multi-period bargaining framework we show that if firm specific training is more productive in foreign firms, foreign firm workers will have a steeper wage profile and thus acquire a premium over time. Using a rich employeremployee matched data set we show that the foreign wage premium is only acquired by workers over time spent in the firm and only by those that receive on the job training, thus providing empirical support for a firm specific human capital acquisition explanation.

Keywords: On-the-job Training, Foreign Firms, Wages

JEL Classification: J24, F23

Suggested Citation

Gorg, Holger and Strobl, Eric and Walsh, Frank, Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More? The Role of On-the-Job Training (October 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=340342 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.340342

Holger Gorg (Contact Author)

University of Kiel ( email )

Olshausenstr. 40
D-24118 Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein 24118
Germany

Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100
Germany

Eric Strobl

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences ( email )

Ecole Polytechnique
Department of Economics
Paris, 75005
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Frank Walsh

National University of Ireland - University College Dublin ( email )

Department of Economics
Belfield
Dublin 4
Ireland
353-1-7068697 (Phone)
353-1-2830068 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucd.ie/~economic/staff/fwalsh/

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