Collateralized Networks
44 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2019
There are 2 versions of this paper
Date Written: June 14, 2019
Abstract
This paper studies the spread of losses and defaults in financial networks with two important features: collateral requirements and alternative contract termination rules in bankruptcy. When collateral is committed to a firm's counterparties, a solvent firm may default if it lacks sufficient liquid assets to meet its payment obligations. Collateral requirements can thus increase defaults and payment shortfalls. Moreover, one firm may benefit from the failure of another if the failure frees collateral committed by the surviving firm, giving it additional resources to make other payments. Contract termination at default may also improve the ability of other firms to meet their obligations. As a consequence of these features, the timing of payments and collateral liquidation must be carefully specified, and establishing the existence of payments that clear the network becomes more complex. Using this framework, we study the consequences of illiquid collateral for the spread of losses through fire sales; we compare networks with and without selective contract termination; and we analyze the impact of alternative bankruptcy stay rules that limit the seizure of collateral at default. Under an upper bound on derivatives leverage, full termination reduces payment shortfalls compared with selective termination.
Keywords: contagion, OTC markets, financial regulation, network, fire sales, collateral, automatic stays for qualified financial contracts
JEL Classification: D53, D70, E44, G1, G28, G33, K22
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