Relational Contracts and Property Rights
University of Mannheim Working Paper
31 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2003
There are 2 versions of this paper
Relational Contracts and Property Rights
Date Written: June 2002
Abstract
We propose a general framework for analyzing and comparing ownership structures with respect to creating incentives for co-operative behavior (e.g. efficient investment) in long-run relationships. We generalize models by Garvey (1995), Halonen (2002), and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and compare their results in the light of our theory, going in depth into the issue of renegotiation of ownership and strategies. We show that when agents are not restricted in their strategy choice to grim trigger strategies, the short term efficient ownership structure identified by Hart and Moore (1990) is not relational efficient - i.e. does not maximize the set of discount factors under which efficient investment can be supported in equilibrium of the repeated game. Moreover, the reletional efficient ownership structure is independent of what can be renegotiated, ownership, strategies, both or none.
JEL Classification: D23, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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