The Regulatory Powers of the European Supervisory Authorities: Constitutional, Political and Functional Considerations

36 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2019

See all articles by Georgina Tsagas

Georgina Tsagas

Brunel University London, Law School

Date Written: September 01, 2016

Abstract

After four years into the operation of the architectural framework of the European System of Financial Supervisors introduced by the de Larosière Report in 2009, the Commission’s report published in 2014 paints a picture of an operational framework, suggesting some areas for improvement. The focus of the present analysis is on the advanced rule-making powers that the European Supervisory Authorities have been equipped with compared to their predecessors. An examination of the European Supervisory Authorities’ legal basis, their governance structures and the process via which the authorities exercise their regulatory powers, sheds some light on the distinction between the constitutional limitations, political concerns and functional objectives that shape the regulatory role of the European Supervisory Authorities. The analysis aims to contribute to the discussion on the overall assessment of the European Supervisory Authorities rulemaking powers and gives consideration to the topic of which institutional elements of the authorities may require an overhaul and why.

Keywords: European Supervisory Authorities, ESMA, EIOPA European System of Financial Supervisors, EU Constitutional Law, regulatory powers, EU

Suggested Citation

Tsagas, Georgina, The Regulatory Powers of the European Supervisory Authorities: Constitutional, Political and Functional Considerations (September 01, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406738

Georgina Tsagas (Contact Author)

Brunel University London, Law School ( email )

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