EU Fiscal Rules: Further Reform or Better Implementation?

16 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2019

See all articles by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

University of Amsterdam - Research Institute in Economics & Econometrics (RESAM); European Commission; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute; Netspar

Martin Larch

European Fiscal Board

Date Written: June 19, 2019

Abstract

EU fiscal rules are a highly divisive topic. Although there is a broad consensus that rules are needed to ensure a smooth functioning of the euro area, views very much diverge over the effectiveness of current arrangements and over how and when to move ahead. This paper reviews the debate around the European fiscal framework. It starts with a concise history of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) highlighting main trends since inception. Based on a brief assessment of the current state of affairs, the paper outlines options for improvement. It argues in favour of a bargain involving new elements of risk reduction and risk sharing combined with a stronger role for independent institutions.

Keywords: Stability and Growth Pact, reform, debt target, net expenditure growth, escape clause, independent fiscal institution

JEL Classification: E6, E62, H6

Suggested Citation

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Larch, Martin, EU Fiscal Rules: Further Reform or Better Implementation? (June 19, 2019). Amsterdam Centre for European Studies Research Paper No. 2019/02 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406750 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406750

Roel M. W. J. Beetsma (Contact Author)

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Martin Larch

European Fiscal Board ( email )

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