On the Evolution of Norms in Strategic Environments

54 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2019

See all articles by Sebastiano Della Lena

Sebastiano Della Lena

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Pietro Dindo

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Date Written: June 20, 2019

Abstract

In a heterogeneous population divided into two cultural groups, we investigate the intergenerational dynamics of norms, modeled as preferences over actions, as depending on strategic environments. We find that environments with strategic complementarity or substitutability lead to different long-run norms and horizontal socializations. When players face many games within the same class, under complementarity agents converge to the same norm and socialization is high, under substitutability norms may diverge or become neutral and socialization is low. However, for specific games, partial convergence can arise under complementarity, providing an explanation to cultural heterogeneity, and partial divergence can arise under substitutability.

Keywords: Evolution of Norms, Cultural Transmission, Endogenous preferences, Cultural Heterogeneity

JEL Classification: C7, D9, I20, J15, Z1

Suggested Citation

Della Lena, Sebastiano and Dindo, Pietro, On the Evolution of Norms in Strategic Environments (June 20, 2019). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 16/WP/2019 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3407246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3407246

Sebastiano Della Lena (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Pietro Dindo

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

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