Improving Efficiency in School Choice Under Partial Priorities

16 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2019 Last revised: 11 Oct 2019

See all articles by Minoru Kitahara

Minoru Kitahara

Osaka City University - Graduate School of Economics

Yasunori Okumura

Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology - Department of Logistics and Information Engineering

Date Written: August 7, 2019

Abstract

We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a student optimal stable matching of this model. Moreover, any student optimal stable matchings that Pareto dominate the starting stable one are shown to be obtained via an algorithm within this class. For the problem of improving efficiency by allowing some priorities to be violated, the algorithms can also be applied, with a weaker assumption on the violations than in the previous study.

Keywords: Matching; Market design; School choice; Partial priorities; Allowable priority violation

JEL Classification: C78; D61; D78; I20

Suggested Citation

Kitahara, Minoru and Okumura, Yasunori, Improving Efficiency in School Choice Under Partial Priorities (August 7, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3407745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3407745

Minoru Kitahara

Osaka City University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

3-3-138 Sugimoto, Sumiyoshi-ku,
Osaka, 558-8585
Japan

Yasunori Okumura (Contact Author)

Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology - Department of Logistics and Information Engineering ( email )

2-1-6 Etchu-Jima
Koto-ku, Tokyo, 135-8533
Japan

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