Sequential Descending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Buyers: Evidence from a Fish Market

33 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2019

Date Written: November 23, 2000

Abstract

The paper reports an analysis of price behaviour at a fish market which is organised as a sequence of descending-price auctions and which is attended by two different types of buyers: retailers and wholesalers. The main outcome of this study is that although each type of buyer paid different prices for quality-corrected lots of fish, the trends of prices are not significantly affected by buyers' asymmetric preferences and behaviours. In addition, the observed trends are best explained by Milgrom and Weber (1982) benchmark model which assumes symmetric risk neutral buyers and by its variations which assume risk averse buyers or an uncertain supply.

Keywords: sequential dutch auctions, perishable goods, declining prices, asymmetric bidders

JEL Classification: D44, D82, L79, L81

Suggested Citation

Pezanis-Christou, Paul, Sequential Descending-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Buyers: Evidence from a Fish Market (November 23, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3408390 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3408390

Paul Pezanis-Christou (Contact Author)

U. of Adelaide School of Economics

Adelaide
Australia

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