A Market for Integrity - An Experiment on Corruption in the Education Sector

71 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2019

See all articles by Ivan Soraperra

Ivan Soraperra

University of Amsterdam - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED)

Nils Köbis

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Charles Efferson

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne

Shaul Shalvi

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Sonja Vogt

ETH Zürich

Theo Offerman

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE)

Date Written: June 18, 2019

Abstract

Corruption in the education sector is pervasive in many (developing) countries. We examine two interventions to fight corruption in education. The first is an increase of the fixed-wage of teachers. The second is the introduction of a piece-rate scheme that rewards teachers according to the number of students that they attract. We model these mechanisms and conduct a lab experiment in Colombia, a country riddled with corruption. After creating a culture of corruption, we introduce either intervention. The increase of the fixed-wage does not diminish bribery. The piece-rate scheme substantially reduces but does not eliminate bribery.

Keywords: education, corruption, theory, experiment

JEL Classification: D73, D82, C90

Suggested Citation

Soraperra, Ivan and Köbis, Nils and Efferson, Charles and Shalvi, Shaul and Vogt, Sonja and Offerman, Theo, A Market for Integrity - An Experiment on Corruption in the Education Sector (June 18, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3409962

Ivan Soraperra

University of Amsterdam - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED) ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Econometrics
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Nils Köbis (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uva.nl/en/profile/k/o/n.c.kobis/n.c.kobis.html

Charles Efferson

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne ( email )

Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

Shaul Shalvi

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/morallabshalvi/

Sonja Vogt

ETH Zürich ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland

Theo Offerman

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics & Econometrics (FEE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4294 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

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