Commissioning the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

68 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2019 Last revised: 5 Aug 2019

See all articles by Jolina C. Cuaresma

Jolina C. Cuaresma

Georgetown University Law Center; University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Date Written: June 15, 2019

Abstract

There has been much debate over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s lack of executive and congressional oversight: its single director removable only for cause and its operations are not subject to appropriations. This paper explains how this very leadership and accountability structure — intended to politically insulate the agency — had the perverse effect of politicizing it. Since Director Cordray’s departure, there has been increased regulatory uncertainty, discouraging financial innovation and harming consumer welfare. This paper recommends that Congress restructure the Bureau into a multi-member, bipartisan commission to provide industry regulatory predictability and ensure that consumer protection retains its independent seat in the financial regulatory system.

Keywords: financial crisis, CFPB, agency design, financial regulation, regulatory predictability, financial innovation

Suggested Citation

Cuaresma, Jolina, Commissioning the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (June 15, 2019). Loyola Consumer Law Review, Vol. 31, 2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3410677

Jolina Cuaresma (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

McDonough Hall
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202.662.9908 (Phone)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/jolina-cuaresma/

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