The Political Economy of Social Security Reform

32 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2019 Last revised: 1 Jul 2024

See all articles by Michael Boskin

Michael Boskin

Stanford University

Diego Perez

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Daniel Bennett

Stanford University

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible.

Suggested Citation

Boskin, Michael and Perez, Diego J. and Bennett, Daniel, The Political Economy of Social Security Reform (June 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25985, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411381

Michael Boskin (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Diego J. Perez

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States

Daniel Bennett

Stanford University ( email )

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