Commitments and Network Governance in EU Antitrust: Gasorba

(2018) 55 Common Market Law Review, Issue 6, pp. 1959–1987

30 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2019

See all articles by Stavros Makris

Stavros Makris

European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW); SciencesPo - Sciences po Paris Law School

Alexandre Ruiz Feases

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: December 1, 2018

Abstract

To what extent can a national competition authority or a national court find a competition law infringement in a case already subjected to commitments of the European Commission? This is one of the questions that lie at the heart of the controversy in Gasorba. This case provided the ECJ with the opportunity to clarify the legal nature and effects of commitments in EU competition law. In this case note, we analyse the preliminary ruling of the ECJ and we argue that, apart from clarifying the legal nature of commitments, the ECJ strikes a dynamic balance between public and private enforcement. Moreover, far from undermining the principle of legal certainty and generating coordination failures, we claim that Gasorba allows for ‘modest experimentalism’ in EU antitrust enforcement and ‘regulatory conversations' between enforcers.

Note: “Reprinted from Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, Issue 6, 2018, pp. 1959–1987, with permission of Kluwer Law International.”

Keywords: EU antitrust, ECN, commitments, Legal certainty, Network coordination, Experimentalism

JEL Classification: K21, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Makris, Stavros and Ruiz Feases, Alexandre, Commitments and Network Governance in EU Antitrust: Gasorba (December 1, 2018). (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review, Issue 6, pp. 1959–1987. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3412995

Stavros Makris

European University Institute, Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Boccaccio 121 (Villa Schifanoia)
Firenze
Italy

SciencesPo - Sciences po Paris Law School ( email )

13 rue de l'université
Reims, 75007
France

Alexandre Ruiz Feases (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/persons/alex-ruiz-feases

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