Aid Scepticism and Effective Altruism

Journal of Practical Ethics, Volume 7, Number 1, June 2019

12 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2019

See all articles by William MacAskill

William MacAskill

University of Oxford - Faculty of Philosophy

Date Written: June 30, 2019

Abstract

In the article, ‘Being Good in a World of Need: Some Empirical Worries and an Uncomfortable Philosophical Possibility,’ Larry Temkin presents some concerns about the possible impact of international aid on the poorest people in the world, suggesting that the nature of the duties of beneficence of the global rich to the global poor are much more murky than some people have made out.

In this article, I’ll respond to Temkin from the perspective of effective altruism — one of the targets he attacks. I’ll argue that Temkin’s critique has little empirical justification, given the conclusions he wants to reach, and is therefore impotent.

Keywords: Effective Altruism, Ethics, Philosophy

Suggested Citation

MacAskill, William, Aid Scepticism and Effective Altruism (June 30, 2019). Journal of Practical Ethics, Volume 7, Number 1, June 2019 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413628

William MacAskill (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Philosophy ( email )

10 Merton Street
Oxford OX1 4JJ
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
48
Abstract Views
192
PlumX Metrics