Does Learning About Low GAAP Reporting Quality Change Investors' Perceptions of Aggressive Non-GAAP Reporting Choices?
53 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2019 Last revised: 30 Apr 2021
Date Written: March 11, 2020
Material financial restatements reveal GAAP-based misreporting and thus are a strong signal of low GAAP reporting quality. We explore these reporting shocks and investigate whether heightened investor scrutiny of GAAP reporting quality after material restatements has a spillover effect on investors’ perceptions of aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices. We find that investors reward aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices before material restatements (i.e., ERC premium) but penalize the same reporting choices after material restatements (i.e., ERC discount). Furthermore, we document that short- and long-term market reactions to material restatements are more negative for firms that aggressively reported non-GAAP earnings before the announcement of material restatements. We provide evidence that heightened investor scrutiny of GAAP reporting quality affects investors’ perceptions of aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices. Finally, our findings are consistent with the idea that aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices misled investors before material restatement announcements.
Keywords: Non-GAAP reporting, investor scrutiny, financial restatements, information content of earnings, mispricing
JEL Classification: G1, K4, M4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation