Market Ethics

49 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2019 Last revised: 23 Sep 2019

See all articles by David Easley

David Easley

Cornell University - Department of Economics; Cornell University - Department of Information Science

Maureen O'Hara

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Date Written: August 26, 2019

Abstract

We use a model of psychological-games-played-on-a-network to demonstrate a role for endogenously determined, rationally chosen ethics. Our analysis produces sharp results about the contagion of non-ethical or ethical behavior and about the possible stable configurations of each type of behavior. We find, and quantify, critical densities for clusters of each type of behavior that determine everything about contagion and stability. We then use these results to show how regulations, market structure and social opprobrium can affect whether clusters of ethical behavior can survive and how large they can be.

Keywords: ethics, contagion, regulation, market structure

Suggested Citation

Easley, David and O'Hara, Maureen, Market Ethics (August 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3415626 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415626

David Easley (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )

414 Uris Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7601
United States
607-255-6283 (Phone)
607-255-2818 (Fax)

Cornell University - Department of Information Science ( email )

402 Bill & Melinda Gates Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Maureen O'Hara

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-3645 (Phone)
607-255-5993 (Fax)

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