Boards’ Corruption Culture and Bank Loan Contracts

46 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2019

See all articles by Robin

Robin

Yuan Ze University - College of Management

Chia‐Wei Huang

Yuan Ze University

Chih-Yung Lin

National Chiao-Tung University

Date Written: October 1, 2018

Abstract

This paper investigates the impacts of board’s corruption culture on the financing costs of firms. Evidence shows that lending banks attach higher loan spreads, higher total costs of borrowing, and stricter covenants to firms with a strong corruption culture in their boards. The results are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and boards using a variety of econometric techniques. We further document that the effect of the board’s corruption becomes stronger when firms have weak governance mechanisms. Our paper suggests that banks recognize board’s culture of corruption as a sort of agency problem when they make lending decisions.

Keywords: Board corruption culture, bank loan spread, corporate governance, financing cost, agency problem.

JEL Classification: G21, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

, Robin and Huang, Chia-Wei and Lin, Chih-Yung, Boards’ Corruption Culture and Bank Loan Contracts (October 1, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3416020

Robin

Yuan Ze University - College of Management ( email )

320 No.135, Neicuo Rd.
Zhongli City
Taiwan

Chia-Wei Huang

Yuan Ze University ( email )

135, Far-East Rd., Chung-Li
Taoyuan, ROC
Taiwan

Chih-Yung Lin (Contact Author)

National Chiao-Tung University ( email )

Taiwan

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
188
PlumX Metrics