After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies

55 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2002 Last revised: 13 Nov 2022

See all articles by Karla Hoff

Karla Hoff

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

When Russia launched mass privatization, it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law. That didn't happen. We present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the Pareto efficient rule of the game.' The reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping, and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law.

Suggested Citation

Hoff, Karla and Stiglitz, Joseph E., After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies (October 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9282, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=341851

Karla Hoff

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/khoff

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Joseph E. Stiglitz (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
814 Uris Hall
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-0671 (Phone)
(212) 662-8474 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.josephstiglitz.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
91
Abstract Views
2,581
Rank
75,652
PlumX Metrics