The Economics of Computational Reproducibility

56 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2019 Last revised: 23 Dec 2023

See all articles by Jean-Edouard Colliard

Jean-Edouard Colliard

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Christophe Hurlin

University of Orleans

Christophe Pérignon

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 20, 2023

Abstract

We investigate why economics displays a relatively low level of computational reproducibility. We first study the benefits and costs of reproducibility for readers, authors, and academic journals. Second, we show that the equilibrium level of reproducibility may be suboptimally low due to three market failures: a competitive bottleneck effect due to the competition between journals to attract authors, the public good dimension of reproducibility, and the positive externalities of reproducibility outside academia. Third, we discuss different policies to address these market failures and move out of a low reproducibility equilibrium. In particular, we show that coordination among journals could reduce by half the cost of verifying the reproducibility of accepted papers.

Keywords: research reproducibility, trust in science, peer-review process, confidential data

JEL Classification: C80, C81, C88

Suggested Citation

Colliard, Jean-Edouard and Hurlin, Christophe and Pérignon, Christophe, The Economics of Computational Reproducibility (December 20, 2023). HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2019-1345, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3418896 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3418896

Jean-Edouard Colliard

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

France

Christophe Hurlin

University of Orleans ( email )

Université d'Orléans
Rue de Blois B.P. 6739 45
France

Christophe Pérignon (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

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