Monopsony Power in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Tracks

36 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2019 Last revised: 28 May 2020

See all articles by Austan Goolsbee

Austan Goolsbee

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Chad Syverson

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2019

Abstract

This paper tests for and measures monopsony power in the U.S. higher education labor market. It does so by directly estimating the residual labor supply curves facing individual four-year colleges and universities using school-specific labor demand instruments. The results indicate that schools have significant monopsony power over their tenure track faculty. Its magnitude is monotonic in rank, being greatest over full professors and smaller for associate and assistant professors. For non-tenure track faculty, however, universities do not seem to have any monopsony power and instead face perfectly elastic residual labor supply curves. Universities’ market power over tenure track faculty does not differ between public and private schools nor between female and male faculty. Monopsony power is greater for larger universities, and the geographic market for faculty seems to be national rather than local. Monopsony power is also larger at higher-status institutions as measured by Carnegie classifications, average test scores of the undergraduate student body, or initial salary rankings. The results also suggest that monopsony power has contributed to the trend toward non-tenure track faculty in U.S.

JEL Classification: I23, J42

Suggested Citation

Goolsbee, Austan and Syverson, Chad, Monopsony Power in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Tracks (December 2019). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2019-95, Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 20-13, Initiative on Global Markets Paper No. 171, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420042 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3420042

Austan Goolsbee

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-5869 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Chad Syverson (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
163
Abstract Views
1,408
rank
222,781
PlumX Metrics