The Evolutionary Snowdrift Game with Punishment in a Spatial-Structured Two-Population Arrangement

11 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2019

See all articles by Douglas Silveira

Douglas Silveira

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Andre Barreira da Silva Rocha

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

Date Written: June 19, 2016

Abstract

In this article, we propose a Snowdrift Game with costly punishment in a spatial-structured two-population arrangement. In order to generate the results, we use the Agent Based Simulation (ABS) model. The numerical simulations as well as the dynamics observed in the ABS are analyzed and discussed. In contrast to a single structured population, the P strategy survives only in one of the cases analyzed. The competitive dynamics and the evolutionary equilibrium of the game arranged in two spatial-structured populations differs from the standard behavior detected in the literature. Thus, we can observe: (i) entire populations of C and D; (ii) the coexistence of C and P in the same population for the case in which the cost for the benefit of cooperating is low.

Keywords: Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, Agent Based Simulation

JEL Classification: C62, C63, C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Silveira, Douglas and da Silva Rocha, Andre Barreira, The Evolutionary Snowdrift Game with Punishment in a Spatial-Structured Two-Population Arrangement (June 19, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3421414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3421414

Douglas Silveira (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada

Andre Barreira Da Silva Rocha

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

225 - Gávea
Rua Marquês de São Vicente
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro 22451-900
Brazil

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
5
Abstract Views
156
PlumX Metrics