Download This PaperOn Sufficiency of Dominant Strategy Implementation in Environments with Correlated Types
6 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2019
Date Written: April 19, 2015
Abstract
We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition.
Keywords: mechanism design, dominant strategy implementation, surplus extraction, correlation
JEL Classification: D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kushnir, Alexey I., On Sufficiency of Dominant Strategy Implementation in Environments with Correlated Types (April 19, 2015). Economics Letters, Vol. 133, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422873
Alexey I. Kushnir (Contact Author)
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
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