On Sufficiency of Dominant Strategy Implementation in Environments with Correlated Types

6 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2019

See all articles by Alexey Kushnir

Alexey Kushnir

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Date Written: April 19, 2015

Abstract

We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent's matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition.

Keywords: mechanism design, dominant strategy implementation, surplus extraction, correlation

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Kushnir, Alexey I., On Sufficiency of Dominant Strategy Implementation in Environments with Correlated Types (April 19, 2015). Economics Letters, Vol. 133, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422873

Alexey I. Kushnir (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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