Mergers between Backward Integrated Firms: Insights from Basf/Solvay's Polyamide Business

Forthcoming, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice

10 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2019

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Nicola Tosini

NERA Economic Consulting

Date Written: June 21, 2019

Abstract

• When a supplier has multiple uses for its product, its sales-based share in a market may provide more useful first indications of its market power in that market than its production- or capacity-based share.

• In particular, the small sales share of a supplier in a market suggests that its effective incremental cost of serving that market, which is the cost of foregoing the best alternative use for its product, is large and its market power in that market is small, irrespective of the size of its overall production or capacity.

• When the products that are manufactured with the internally sourced input are in direct competition in the downstream market with the products that are manufactured by the upstream market’s customers, internal sales of the upstream product may constitute, by increasing demand elasticity in the upstream market, an indirect competitive constraint on it.

• If the elimination of double marginalisation creates the incentive for the merged entity to expand production, a capacity constraint upstream may be reached, giving rise to effects that, being neither horizontal nor vertical in nature, we consider non-traditional.

Keywords: capacity constraints, market shares, mergers, opportunity cost

JEL Classification: K21, L4

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Tosini, Nicola, Mergers between Backward Integrated Firms: Insights from Basf/Solvay's Polyamide Business (June 21, 2019). Forthcoming, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422896

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

Nicola Tosini (Contact Author)

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

Unter den Linden 14
Berlin, 10117
Germany
30700150670 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nera.com/experts/nicola-tosini.html

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