Gender Quotas in the Boardroom: New Evidence from Germany

44 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2019

See all articles by Alexandra Fedorets

Alexandra Fedorets

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Anna Gibert

European University Institute; German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Norma Burow

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Date Written: July 2019

Abstract

We examine the introduction of a gender quota law in Germany, mandating a minimum 30% of the underrepresented gender on the supervisory boards of a particular type of firms. We exploit the fact that Germany has a two-tier corporate system consisting of the affected supervisory boards and unaffected management boards within the same firm. We find a positive effect on the female share on supervisory boards of affected firms, but no effect on presidency of the board or its size. We also study whether the increased female representation has had an effect on the financial performance of the firm and conclude that, unlike some previous studies in other countries, there has not been any negative effect on the profitability of the firm, neither at the time when the law was announced nor when it was passed.

Keywords: Gender quota, Economics of gender, Labor discrimination, Personnel economics, Firm performance

JEL Classification: J78, J16, M51, L25

Suggested Citation

Fedorets, Alexandra and Gibert, Anna and Schmitt Burow, Norma, Gender Quotas in the Boardroom: New Evidence from Germany (July 2019). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1810 (2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423868 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423868

Alexandra Fedorets (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Anna Gibert

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014
Italy

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Norma Schmitt Burow

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
234
Abstract Views
1,063
rank
169,944
PlumX Metrics