Dynamic Choice with Volitional Attention

44 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2019 Last revised: 29 Oct 2020

See all articles by Pantelis Karapanagiotis

Pantelis Karapanagiotis

EBS Business School; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Date Written: October 18, 2020

Abstract

Dynamic choices of cognitively constrained individuals have been ascribed, by the rational inattention theory, as being a filtering problem, in which the attentional intensity is consciously elected. Human attention, however, is not merely of voluntary intensity; it is rather of volitional placement nature. In this article, I study the implications of a dynamic theory of volitional attention describing individuals who choose among the alternatives that are induced by their attentional choices. Firstly, a consumer search application using US scanner data indicates that attentional choices are characterized by complementarities. Costs do not exclusively depend on the cardinality of consideration sets, but also on experience and similarities between considered items. Neglecting, thereby, attentional placement aspects potentially leads to misidentification of preference characteristics. Secondly, participation inertia in financial markets is revisited under the scope of volitional attention and a cultural-based argument of why it can be optimal not to participate is provided.

Keywords: bounded rationality, volitional attention, attentional costs, consideration sets, endogenous choice sets, consumer research

JEL Classification: C61, D11, D91, M31

Suggested Citation

Karapanagiotis, Pantelis, Dynamic Choice with Volitional Attention (October 18, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423876 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423876

Pantelis Karapanagiotis (Contact Author)

EBS Business School ( email )

Gustav-Stresemann-Ring 3
65189 Wiesbaden, Hessen
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt, 60323
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
112
Abstract Views
968
Rank
416,388
PlumX Metrics