Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance

33 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2003

See all articles by Heitor Almeida

Heitor Almeida

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Abstract

Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile economic performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross-country and within-country variability in growth rates. It is also true for some measures of policies. Finally, we show that both the best and worst performers in terms of growth rates are more likely to be autocracies. We argue that the evidence in the paper is consistent with the theoretical implications in Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and Rodrik (1999a).

Suggested Citation

Almeida, Heitor and Ferreira, Daniel, Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance. Economics and Politics, Vol. 14, pp. 225-257, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=342553

Heitor Almeida (Contact Author)

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Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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