Insurance of the Costs of Pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands: A Law and Economics Perspective

Posted: 5 Jan 2003 Last revised: 16 Jun 2010

See all articles by Michael G. Faure

Michael G. Faure

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law

Niels J. Philipsen

Maastricht University - Faculty of Law, Metro

Abstract

In this paper Faure and Philipsen address price regulation and insurance for pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands. The authors first analyse, qualitatively, the complex regulatory framework and insurance for pharmaceuticals. After that, they examine the various actors in the drug distribution market, with a specific focus on pharmacists (as their income is influenced by the insurance mechanism). The findings of this paper are relevant to other areas and other countries as well. After all, a central question is how the regulatory and insurance frameworks affect the optimal allocation of resources with respect to the financing of pharmaceuticals.

Keywords: Health Insurance, Netherlands, Price Regulation, Pharmaceuticals, Public Choice.

JEL Classification: K23, K32

Suggested Citation

Faure, Michael G. and Philipsen, N. J., Insurance of the Costs of Pharmaceuticals in the Netherlands: A Law and Economics Perspective. The Geneva Papers, Vol. 27, pp. 609-625, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=342576

Michael G. Faure (Contact Author)

University of Maastricht - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

PO Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 - 43 - 388 30 60 (Phone)
+31 - 43 - 325 90 91 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.michaelfaure.be

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

N. J. Philipsen

Maastricht University - Faculty of Law, Metro ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands
+31 43 388 3256 (Phone)
+31 43 325 9091 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/show/id=116435/langid=43

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