Talk Less, Learn More: Strategic Disclosure in Response to Managerial Learning from the Options Market

Abstract

We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers’ potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce disclosure to avoid crowding out informed trading, which can give them informative feedback for their decision-making. In support of the managerial learning channel, we document a real effect of reduced disclosure: when managers disclose less, options trading has a stronger positive effect on firm investment efficiency. The more pronounced effect of options trading on management earnings forecasts when the need for managerial learning is higher further supports the learning channel.

Keywords: Options trading; Information feedback; Managerial learning; Management earnings forecasts; Voluntary disclosure

JEL Classification: G12; G14; G20; M40; M41