Privatization and Business Groups: Evidence from the Chicago Boys in Chile

53 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2019 Last revised: 7 Apr 2020

See all articles by Felipe Aldunate

Felipe Aldunate

Universidad de los Andes, Chile - ESE Business School

Felipe González

Queen Mary University of London

Mounu Prem

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Francisco Urzúa I.

City University London - Bayes Business School

Date Written: April 6, 2020

Abstract

Business groups are the predominant organizational structure in modern Chile. This article tests the long-standing hypothesis that the privatization reform implemented by the “Chicago Boys” during the Pinochet regime facilitated the creation of new groups and hence the renovation of the country’s elites. Using new data we find that firms sold during this privatization later became part of new business groups, process aided by an economic crisis that debilitated traditional elites. Moreover, some firms were bought by Pinochet’s allies and were later used as providers of capital within groups. We conclude that privatizations can empower outsiders to replace business elites.

Keywords: government, firms, groups, privatization

JEL Classification: G32, L33

Suggested Citation

Aldunate, Felipe and González, Felipe and Prem, Mounu and Urzua, Francisco, Privatization and Business Groups: Evidence from the Chicago Boys in Chile (April 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3426755 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426755

Felipe Aldunate

Universidad de los Andes, Chile - ESE Business School ( email )

Av. La Plaza 1905
San Carlos de Apoquindo, Las Condes
Santiago
Chile

Felipe González

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Mounu Prem (Contact Author)

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Francisco Urzua

City University London - Bayes Business School ( email )

United Kingdom

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