The Implicit Honesty Premium: Why Honest Advice Is More Persuasive than Highly Informed Advice

Haran, U. & Shalvi S. (2019) The Implicit Honesty Premium:Why Honest Advice Is More Persuasive than Highly Informed Advice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Forthcoming

49 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2019

See all articles by Uriel Haran

Uriel Haran

Ben Gurion University of the Negev

Shaul Shalvi

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Date Written: July 26, 2019

Abstract

Recipients of advice expect it to be both highly informed and honest. Suspecting either one of these attributes reduces the use of the advice. Does the degree of advice use depend on the reason for suspecting its accuracy? Five experiments tested the effect of the type of suspicion on advice taking. We find that recipients of advice discount it more severely when they suspect intentional bias than when they suspect unintentional error, for example, due to the advisor’s insufficient knowledge. The effect persisted when we controlled for, and disclosed, the actual accuracy of the advice; it persisted when participants’ own evaluations of the quality of the advice, as well as their desire to receive it, were equally high under both types of suspicion. Finally, we find the effect of suspicion on advice use stems from the different attributions of uncertainty associated with each type of suspicion. The results suggest people place an implicit premium on advisors’ honesty, and demonstrate the importance of establishing reputation for advisors’ success.

Suggested Citation

Haran, Uriel and Shalvi, Shaul, The Implicit Honesty Premium: Why Honest Advice Is More Persuasive than Highly Informed Advice (July 26, 2019). Haran, U. & Shalvi S. (2019) The Implicit Honesty Premium:Why Honest Advice Is More Persuasive than Highly Informed Advice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3426994

Uriel Haran (Contact Author)

Ben Gurion University of the Negev ( email )

Be'er Sheva
8410501
Israel

Shaul Shalvi

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/morallabshalvi/

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