The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Abstract

This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage, attract more institutional ownership, and have better long-term performance. Our IPO sample is restricted to a set of 107 real estate investment trusts (REITs) over the 1991 to 1998 time period. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this - combined with our use of IPOs - mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms' valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures not only have higher initial IPO valuations, but also have better long-term operating performance than their peers.

Keywords: IPO, Corporate Governance, REITs, Compensation

JEL Classification: G14, G32, G34, D82, L14