The Political Cost of Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Evidence from Colombian Infrastructure Development

Forthcoming, Governance

55 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2019

See all articles by Camila Angulo Amaya

Camila Angulo Amaya

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science

Anthony M. Bertelli

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics; Pennsylvania State University

Eleanor F. Woodhouse

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Date Written: July 26, 2019

Abstract

Infrastructure public-private partnerships (PPPs) eschew traditional public management to provide distributive goods worldwide. Yet, in Colombia, the context of our study, both the promise of and voters’ experience with PPPs hinder incumbent parties in elections when theories of distributive politics expect otherwise. We argue that negative experiences with PPPs introduce a sociotropic turn in individual voting: bad experience crowds out the possibility that promising a new project will improve a voter’s own welfare. Studying what are to our knowledge all 109 Colombian PPP projects between 1998-2014, and over 8,700 individual survey responses, our evidence shows that vote intention for the incumbent executive or his party decreases as experience with more PPPs in respondents’ districts increases. Our analysis and results introduce an important agenda for research into the political significance of these legacies of New Public Management.

Keywords: public-private partnerships, political behavior, distributive politics, sociotropic voting, Colombia, public administration

JEL Classification: H4

Suggested Citation

Angulo Amaya, Camila and Bertelli, Anthony M. and Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence, The Political Cost of Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Evidence from Colombian Infrastructure Development (July 26, 2019). Forthcoming, Governance, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427272

Camila Angulo Amaya

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Political Science ( email )

1050 Bascom Mall
Madison, WI 53706
United States

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Eleanor Florence Woodhouse

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

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