Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform

42 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2019

See all articles by Massimo Morelli

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Elliott Ash

ETH Zürich

Matia Vannoni

King's College London

Date Written: July 2019

Abstract

This paper sheds new light on the drivers of civil service reform in U.S. states. We first demonstrate theoretically that divided government is a key trigger of civil service reform, providing nuanced predictions for specific configurations of divided government. We then show empirical evidence for these predictions using data from the second half of the 20th century: states tended to introduce these reforms under divided government, and in particular when legislative chambers (rather than legislature and governor) were divided.

Suggested Citation

Morelli, Massimo and Ash, Elliott and Vannoni, Matia, Divided Government, Delegation, and Civil Service Reform (July 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13878, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428402

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Elliott Ash (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Matia Vannoni

King's College London ( email )

Strand
London, England WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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