Market Disputes | Legal, Social, and Long-Term Implications for an Evolving Spectrum Market

12 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2019 Last revised: 19 Sep 2019

See all articles by J Stephanie Rose

J Stephanie Rose

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences, Students

Martin B. H. Weiss

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences

Taieb Znati

Independent

Marcela Gomez

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences

Pedro Bustamante

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences, Students

Debarun Das

Independent

Date Written: July 26, 2019

Abstract

Enforcement, adjudication, and litigation enacted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) resides at an interesting intersection between traditional law and normative common property resource agreements – similar to those in common pool resources. Despite being granted specific legal powers by Congress, the FCC works to dissolve contentions that arise between spectrum incumbents through market dispute resolutions mediated through their Enforcement Bureau’s Market and Dispute Resolution Division (MDRD). The MDRD mediates and adjudicates a myriad of complaint types brought on by “market participants, entities, and organizations against common carriers, commercial and mobile data service providers, and/or utility pole operators” (EB-Market Disputes and Resolution Division, n.d.).

The MDRD’s decision to promote resolutions between complainants and defendants is unique in terms of traditional enforcement mechanisms – especially as a primary regulatory agency. The initiative to have stakeholders mediate, negotiate, and ultimately settle their disputes on their level is reminiscent of dispute remediation tactics observed in common pool resource environments. To investigate this approach to enforcement, adjudication, and litigation further, we utilize the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom. Used to scaffold a myriad of policy, regulatory, and traditional CPRs, the IAD Framework incites a unique investigation into the agreements that arise between disputing parties.

Our work shows that state/government regulation is not explicitly required to foster an enforcement environment. Primarily, this provides a foundation for our work regarding automated enforcement mechanisms, whereby, third party agents through automation can facilitate enforcement effectively within an increasingly overutilized spectrum market.

Keywords: Market Disputes, IAD Framework, FCC, Automated Enforcement, Spectrum, Radio, Regulation, Policy

Suggested Citation

Rose, J Stephanie and Weiss, Martin B. H. and Znati, Taieb and Gomez, Marcela and Bustamante, Pedro and Das, Debarun, Market Disputes | Legal, Social, and Long-Term Implications for an Evolving Spectrum Market (July 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3429406

J Stephanie Rose (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences, Students ( email )

United States

Martin B. H. Weiss

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences ( email )

135 N Bellefield Ave
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

Taieb Znati

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Marcela Gomez

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences ( email )

United States

Pedro Bustamante

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences, Students ( email )

United States

Debarun Das

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
51
PlumX Metrics