Conflict between Non-Exclusive Groups

36 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2019

See all articles by Jonas Send

Jonas Send

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: July 31, 2019

Abstract

I model group conflict over a single public-good prize when individuals are active members of multiple groups simultaneously. First, I introduce a simple model of Tullock group contest with individuals partitioned into two groups in two dimensions each, concave group-level impact function, and convex effort cost. An additional partition dimension does not alter the level of aggregate and individual effort. Asymmetries in group size and effort cost have non-monotonic effects on individual effort and expected utility. The formation of an active additional group has beneficial effects on its members while being detrimental to outsiders. In a second part, I look at an arbitrary number of symmetric groups on an arbitrary number of dimensions. I investigate the full positive range of the Tullock exponent and linear and convex effort cost. Additional group dimensions do not alter individual expected utility of existing equilibria.

Keywords: Group Contest, Multiple Group Membership, Public-good Prize, Tullock Contest, Cost Asymmetry, Group-size Asymmetry

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D71, D74

Suggested Citation

Send, Jonas, Conflict between Non-Exclusive Groups (July 31, 2019). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3429543

Jonas Send (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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