Conflict between Non-Exclusive Groups
36 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2019
Date Written: July 31, 2019
I model group conflict over a single public-good prize when individuals are active members of multiple groups simultaneously. First, I introduce a simple model of Tullock group contest with individuals partitioned into two groups in two dimensions each, concave group-level impact function, and convex effort cost. An additional partition dimension does not alter the level of aggregate and individual effort. Asymmetries in group size and effort cost have non-monotonic effects on individual effort and expected utility. The formation of an active additional group has beneficial effects on its members while being detrimental to outsiders. In a second part, I look at an arbitrary number of symmetric groups on an arbitrary number of dimensions. I investigate the full positive range of the Tullock exponent and linear and convex effort cost. Additional group dimensions do not alter individual expected utility of existing equilibria.
Keywords: Group Contest, Multiple Group Membership, Public-good Prize, Tullock Contest, Cost Asymmetry, Group-size Asymmetry
JEL Classification: C71, C72, D71, D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation