In Defense of the Global Regulation of a 'Duty to Report Crime'

52 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2019

Date Written: March 1, 2018

Abstract

Crimes in the current global-digital era increasingly defy purely domestic “duty to report crime” laws which obligate a wide range of private actors to report for crime deterrence. The characteristics of such crimes take the form of multinational networks of criminals exploiting digitalized services. Domestic laws and enforcement institutions are quite simply inadequate to deter the full-range of global-digital crimes.

Global regulations have emerged to effectuate the domestic regulations of “duty to report crime,” but this type of horizontal cooperation at the state-to-state level alone fails to ensure optimal efficiency of crime deterrence in the modern era. This paper provides rationales for this failure and recommends mutual vertical cooperation between chokepoint private actors reporting crime to the state (“bottom-up”) and the state providing the required information to the chokepoint private actors (“top-down”). It further sets out a legislative blueprint for the global regulation of a “duty to report crime” and suggests three key criteria, all of which must be met for the global regulation to be justified as feasible and legitimate: horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, and proportionality to privacy/reputational harm.

Keywords: global-digital crime, transnational-physical crime, local-physical crime, optimal efficiency of crime deterrence, horizontal cooperation, mutual vertical cooperation, bottom-up, top-down, horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, proportionality to privacy/reputational harm

Suggested Citation

Kang, Sungyong, In Defense of the Global Regulation of a 'Duty to Report Crime' (March 1, 2018). Washburn Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3430144

Sungyong Kang (Contact Author)

Police Science Institute ( email )

Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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