Fast Tracks to Boardrooms: Director Supply and Board Appointments

57 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2019 Last revised: 26 Mar 2024

See all articles by Audinga Baltrunaite

Audinga Baltrunaite

Bank of Italy

Egle Karmaziene

VU University Amsterdam; Swedish House of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 18, 2024

Abstract

We examine how the size of the labor market for corporate directors impacts board appointments in Italian private firms. Using the high-speed railway expansion as an exogenous shock to costs of serving on boards, we find that an increase in the supply of non-local directors leads to a higher degree of positive assortative matching between firms and directors. High-quality firms improve their board quality at the expense of low-quality firms. The director-firm matching effects are muted among companies with owners acting as board directors. This finding highlights the importance of director entrenchment in the corporate governance of private firms.

Keywords: director supply, board of directors, match quality, director entrenchement

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Baltrunaite, Audinga and Karmaziene, Egle, Fast Tracks to Boardrooms: Director Supply and Board Appointments (March 18, 2024). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1278, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431413

Audinga Baltrunaite

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Egle Karmaziene (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
Stockholm, 111 60
Sweden

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