Dualism of Government Guarantees: Evidence from the 2005 FDI Reform Act

43 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2019

See all articles by Diego Puente M.

Diego Puente M.

University of Technology Sydney (UTS; Australian National University (ANU)

Date Written: October 23, 2017


I present a novel approach to the study of the trade-off between stability and moral hazard induced by deposit insurance. Specifically, I use the FDI Reform Act of 2005 as an exogenous shock to the existing insurance scheme in the US and study its impact on bank risk. This reform raised the coverage limit for individual retirement accounts (IRAs) from USD 100,000 to 250,000. I report an increase in banks’ liquidity and insolvency risk caused by this Reform. In addition, I show banks more influenced by the 2005 reform were 38 percentage points less likely to fail during the GFC.

Keywords: deposit insurance, moral hazard, liquidity risk, insolvency risk, banking crises

JEL Classification: G01, G20, G21, G28, E44

Suggested Citation

Puente Moncayo, Diego, Dualism of Government Guarantees: Evidence from the 2005 FDI Reform Act (October 23, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431619

Diego Puente Moncayo (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney (UTS ( email )

15 Broadway, Ultimo
PO Box 123
Sydney, NSW 2007

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601

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