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Corporate Governance and Control

128 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2002  

Marco Becht

Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Patrick Bolton

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ailsa Röell

Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective.

Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership, takeovers, block holders, boards

JEL Classification: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco and Bolton, Patrick and Röell, Ailsa, Corporate Governance and Control (October 2002). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=343461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.343461

Marco Becht

Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB) ( email )

42 Avenue F. D. Roosevelt
1050
Brussels, 1050
Belgium
+32 2 6504466 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.solvay.edu/profile/marcobecht

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

Palace of the Academies
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogstraat
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Ailsa A. Röell

Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-9289 (Phone)

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